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Abstract:
Preventing IT security incidents poses a great challenge for organizations. Today, senior managers allocate more
resources to IT security programs (especially those programs that focus on educating and training employees) in
order to reduce human misbehavior—a significant cause of IT security incidents. Building on the results of a literature
review, we identify factors that affect the success of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs
and organize them in a conceptual classification. The classification contains human influencing factors derived from
different behavioral, decision making, and criminology theories that lead to IT security compliance and
noncompliance. The classification comprehensively summarizes these factors and shows the correlations between
them. The classification can help one to design and develop SETA programs and to establish suitable conditions for
integrating them into organizations.
Keywords: Organizational Security, Security Compliant Behavior, Security Education, Training and Awareness,
SETA.
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Introduction

With the increasing reports of IT security incidents, practitioners and researchers have shown growing
interest in IT security. Different surveys, such as the ―Cyber Security Survey‖ (BSI, 2015), ―2014: A Year of
Mega Breaches‖ (Ponemon, 2015), and ―The Global State of Information Security Survey‖ (PwC, 2014,
2015) have examined the influence of IT security incidents on organizations. The surveys show that the
incidents have raised senior managers‘ concerns about IT security issues and involvement in IT security
in general, which has led to increased organizational budgets for coping with IT security risks. In
particular, organizations have allocated a significant part of these budgets to training and awareness
programs (Ponemon, 2015; PwC, 2014, 2015) and to ―specialized education for the IT security staff‖
because human misbehavior (BSI, 2015) and the lack of expertise (Ponemon, 2015) frequently cause IT
security incidents. Consequently, organizations have a need for IT security education, training, and
awareness (SETA) programs, which focus on educating employees such that they act according to certain
IT security principles and goals (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Thomson & von Solms, 1998).
Researchers have recognized the need for such programs many years before today (Thomson & von
Solms, 1998), and several studies have criticized the technical orientation of many existing and commonly
used IT security programs (e.g., Baker & Wallace, 2007; Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila, & Rees, 2007;
Siponen, 2005). These studies have concluded that we need more research on securing the human factor
since human beings represent the ―weakest link‖ in an IT security system (Bowen, Hash, & Wilson, 2006;
Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). Consequently, effective IT security management should consider both
technological and socio-organizational measures, and SETA programs constitute an important part of the
latter (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). Literature reviews also show that SETA programs constitute a critical
success factor of effective IT security management (Alnatheer, 2015; Tu & Yuan, 2014). However, the
surveys we mention above indicate that current SETA programs have not achieved the desired success,
and other researchers have made similar observations (e.g., Zhang, Reithel, & Li, 2009). These programs
can fail due to issues in the programs themselves or because organizations insufficiently integrate them
into their overall IT security programs.
In order to identify reasons for why SETA programs fail to succeed, we systematically reviewed the
literature on factors that affect their success. In doing so, we concentrated on factors that influence
individuals to comply or not comply with organizational IT security. These factors serve as the starting
point for designing, developing, and integrating SETA programs since the factors predefine these
programs‘ characteristics and features. Additionally, we focus on theories that explain and classify
relevant factors that affect the success of SETA programs. We do so because the lack of theory-grounded
approaches to create SETA programs may represent one reason for their ineffectiveness (Puhakainen &
Siponen, 2010). Thus, our review extends the literature review that Aurigemma and Panko (2012)
conducted on theories on human behavior in the IT security context but that concentrated only on human
behavior related to information security policy compliance. Additionally, in our review, we synthesize
relevant factors that affect the success of SETA programs in a conceptual classification due to the fact
that many isolated factors influence individuals‘ IT security behavior that individually deliver only a
fragmented picture of possible causal effects. Classifying them in a proper way will better explain the
correlations between them.
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we explain the research methodology we used to conduct
our review. In Section 3, we present the theories that research has used to explain human behavior in the
IT security context and classify relevant factors that affect the success of SETA programs. In Section 4,
we summarizing the paper‘s main contributions, discuss its limitations, and suggest directions for future
research.
Contribution:
We conducted a systematic literature review on factors that explain individuals‘ compliant and noncompliant behavior
in the IT security context. As such, we contribute to existing knowledge on the topic with a conceptual classification
and discuss future research directions. The conceptual classification comprehensively summarizes relevant factors
that affect the success of security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs that we derived from different
theories and found empirical evidence for. Furthermore, the paper discusses the dependencies and the influencing
directions between the factors and suggests implications for SETA programs. Researchers and practitioners in the
organizational IT security management field should find interest in this paper. Both parties can use our findings in
designing, developing, and implementing SETA programs. Additionally, the paper outlines research directions that
target researchers who want to advance research on the topic.
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Methodology

A literature review gathers, analyzes, and synthesizes the existing knowledge on a certain topic (Cooper,
1988). One can conduct such a review to, among other things, show inconsistencies in the existing
literature, identify research gaps, derive a research agenda, or develop a conceptual framework or a
classification of constructs (Torraco, 2005; Webster & Watson, 2002). In this study, we focus on the latter:
on developing a conceptual classification of the factors that influence human behavior in the IT security
context. Our literature review builds on vom Brocke et al.‘s (2009) framework. The framework comprises
five steps: 1) define the review scope, 2) conceptualize the topic, 3) search the literature, 4) analyze and
synthesize the literature, and 5) propose research agenda. However, we focus only on the first four steps
since, as Torraco (2005) notes, the fifth step simply represents one possible way to synthesize the
literature. As we explain in Section 1, we focus on another form of synthesis (i.e., conceptually classifying
constructs). Nevertheless, we provide an agenda for future research in Section 4.

2.1

Review Scope

To define the review‘s scope, we used an established taxonomy from Cooper (1988) that vom Brocke et
al. (2009) recommend. In our review, we focused on research outcomes (i.e., identified factors that affect
whether SETA programs succeed) and on theories that explain and classify these factors. Additionally, we
concentrated on empirical studies because we wanted to include only empirically evaluated factors in our
classification since SETA programs also need empirical evidence to succeed (Puhakainen & Siponen,
2010). We conducted the review in order to integrate the outcomes in a conceptual classification. As such,
we organize the review conceptually. We take a neutral perspective since we focus on integrating different
positions. Further, we consider the coverage of our review as representative of the literature in which
researchers investigate human behavior in the context of IT security by using different theories. We used
a sound process to identify this literature, which we explain in Section 2.3. The target audience for the
review includes general scholars interested in the topic and scholars specialized in IT security
management. Table 1 highlights the categories relevant for this review.
Table 1. Positioning of This Review in Cooper’s Taxonomy of Literature Reviews (Cooper, 1988)
Characteristic

Categories

Focus

Research outcomes

Goal

Integration

Criticism

Central issues

Organization

Historical

Conceptual

Methodological

Perspective

2.2

Research methods

Neutral representation

Theories

Applications

Espousal of position

Coverage

Exhaustive

Exhaustive with
selective citation

Representative

Central or pivotal

Audience

Specialized scholars

General scholars

Practitioners

General public

Topic Conceptualization

Conceptualizing a review‘s topic allows one to organize the review in a coherent way since doing so
provides ―working definitions of the key terms‖ (vom Brocke et al., 2009, p. 8), information on what is
known about the topic, and a conceptual structure (Torraco, 2005). Following these recommendations, we
start with explaining the key terms in our review.
SETA programs provide individuals with general IT security knowledge and skills to cope with IT security
issues properly and knowledge of an organization‘s IT security policy (D‘Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009;
Wilson & Hash, 2003). As a result, a security policy represents a precondition for an organization‘s SETA
program (Whitman, 2003). Generally, a policy refers to ―a communication document from management‖
that determines what action the organization‘s stakeholders take (ISACA, 2015, p. 71; von Solms & von
Solms, 2004; Whitman & Mattord, 2012, p. 177). An IT security policy defines rules, instructions, roles,
and responsibilities for an organization‘s members to protect its IT and the consequences in case
individuals violate the IT security policy (Whitman & Mattord, 2012, p. 177). Organizations define their
general IT security policies at the strategic management level, and they need to concretize or expand
them into ―lower-level‖ policies that generally handle a specific issue or system in a detailed manner
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(Swanson & Guttman, 1996, p. 13 ff.; von Solms, Thomson, & Maninjwa, 2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2012,
p. 179 ff.).
Little research has examined the effects and effectiveness of SETA programs. Puhakainen and Siponen
(2010) investigated several awareness program approaches for information systems (IS) security policy
compliance and found that most lacked a theoretical ground and empirical evidence of practical
applicability, which, they argued, may constitute reasons for their ineffectiveness. Based on these
findings, they proposed and empirically tested a theory-based program for IS security policy compliance
training. The test‘s results suggest that both content-related characteristics (e.g., how comprehensively
the program describes issues, how difficult employees find using the security techniques it mandates) and
environmental factors (e.g., whether top management becomes involved in the program and how well the
organization integrates the program as a continuation process) influence program success. D‘Arcy et al.
(2009) created a model for IT security awareness and tested it empirically on about 200 computer users.
They found that SETA programs deter users from misusing IT since it helps them to develop awareness
about the consequences they may experience if caught doing so. Tarwireyi, Flowerday, and Bayaga
(2011) examined the competency of university students regarding password management and found that,
even though students were familiar with password-management policies, many did not comply with them.
Therefore, the authors suggest that the success of awareness programs depends on two main factors
(i.e., human skills/knowledge and human behavior) and that the skills and knowledge are a prerequisite
for the behavior. Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, and Jerram (2014) examined the relationship
between knowledge, attitude and behavior in the information security field and concluded that individuals‘
knowledge about information security policies and procedures positively influences their attitude towards
policy and procedures and that both good knowledge and attitudes lead to a more risk-reverse behavior.
Knowledge alone turned out to have a weak effect on behavior. Therefore, the authors suggest that SETA
programs should contain both knowledge-related components that refer to how an employee should act
and attitude-related components that refer to why they should act in the expected way (Parsons et al.,
2014, pp. 165, 174). Maqousi, Balikhina, and Mackay (2013) suggest that, in order for a SETA program to
be effective, one should individually tailor it to a specific group of people or organization. According to
these authors, group- and organization-specific factors lead people to react differently to a program.
Therefore, in developing a SETA program, one should follow a certain approach that begins with
analyzing the specific human and organizational factors in the organization one develops the program for
and that also contains maintenance and measurement processes to keep the program up to date and
measure its success.
The above studies show that we can divide the research on SETA programs into two main streams: 1) a
stream that investigates human behavior and, in particular, the factors that lead to security compliant or
noncompliant behavior and 2) a stream that deals with processes for developing SETA programs. In our
paper, we focus on the first stream and, therefore, need a suitable framework to structure relevant factors
that affect the success of SETA programs. As we explain above, organizations implement SETA programs
to achieve certain human behaviors (e.g., report identified security risks) through influencing two main
factors: knowledge (e.g., by explaining what security risks are) and motivation (e.g., by awarding reports
on identified security risks). The knowledge, attitude and behavior (KAB) model represents one suitable
framework that integrates these factors. Researchers have used the KAB model in different areas but
generally to measure educational effects or performance improvement (Schrader & Lawless, 2004).
Parsons et al. (2014) also use it as their theoretical base. We use its three constructs—knowledge,
attitude, and behavior—as the main dimensions for our classification.

2.3

Literature Search

Following Levy and Ellis‘ (2006) and vom Brocke et al.‘s (2009) recommendations for concentrating on
qualitative literature, we restricted our search to peer-reviewed journal and conference papers. For this
search, which we conducted in May and June, 2016, we used the databases Web of Science and
EBSCOhost because they contain highly ranked IS journals and conference proceedings. However, in
addition to papers from the IS research domain, we also included the behavioral and organizational
research domains in the search because we considered them relevant for the topic. Specifically, we
searched the title, keyword, and abstract fields with the keyword combination ―(‗information security‘ OR
‗information technolog* security‘ OR ‗information system* security‘) AND human AND (incident* OR
accident* OR breach* OR error* OR *behavior)‖. We limited the search to papers published from 2006 to
2016. From this search, we obtained 96 hits (Web of Science: 53, EBSCOhost: 43). We removed 23
duplicates and irrelevant papers based on reading their title and/or abstract, which left 63 papers
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remaining. From these 63 papers, only 16 discussed theory-grounded factors. However, two of those 16
papers did not empirically evaluate the factors, so we dropped them. As a result, 14 papers remained.
Although the databases Web of Science and EBSCOhost index high-quality journal and conference
papers, the 14 papers we identified as relevant came from only journals. Therefore, we conducted a
second search using the AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) data that, in addition to established IS journal
papers, also contains the leading IS conference proceedings (e.g., International Conference on
Information Systems (ICIS), European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Pacific Asia
Conference on Information Systems (PACIS), Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
(HICSS)). We conducted this second search in December, 2017. We limited the search to papers
published from 2006 to 2017. We initially obtained 87 hits. After reviewing their titles and abstracts, we
dropped 59 papers, which left 28 for further consideration. At this point, we excluded further six papers
because they did not fulfill our defined criteria (most only proposed a research model without testing it
empirically or did not ground their model with theory). We also conducted a third search to update our first
one: we followed the same procedure for the first search as we explain above but expanded the timeframe
to the end of 2017. As a result, we obtained six further journal papers. Thus, the second and third
searches added 28 papers in total to the initial 14. Altogether, we considered 42 papers (22 conference
and 20 journal papers) for the final analysis.

3

Literature Analysis and Synthesis

In Section 3.1, we review the theories that the papers we analyzed used. The Section 3.2, we use the
KAB model to classify relevant factors that affect the success of SETA programs.

3.1

Relevant Theories

The studies we reviewed used 27 theories to explain various IT security-related behaviors. The theory of
planned behavior (TPB), the most frequently used theory, appeared in 14 papers. Following that, the
deterrence theory (DT) and the protection motivation theory (PMT) appeared in nine papers each.
Rational chance theory (RChT) and reactance theory (RT) appeared in three papers each. As for the
remaining 22 theories, 11 appeared in two papers each, and the other 11 appeared in only one paper
each. Table 2 lists the theories, briefly describes them, and notes how many times papers used them.
Table 2. Theories Used to Explain IT Security Behavior in the Literature
Theory

Times
used

Description

According to the TPB, intention is the main predecessor of behavior and describes the motivation to
behave in a certain manner. TPB assumes that ―the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the
Theory of planned
more likely should be its performance‖ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). The constructs attitude towards behavior,
behavior (TPB)
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control explain intention itself. The TPB extends the TRA: it
adds perceived behavior control to the explaining factors of intention (Ajzen, 1991).

14

DT, sometimes also referred to as general deterrence theory (GDT), postulates that humans take
actions based on rational decisions, which requires them to know the possible consequences of their
actions. In its basic form, DT stipulates that punishment (which the theory explains with the three
Deterrence theory components certainty, severity, and celerity) as a consequence of an illegal action has a negative
(DT)
influence on an individual‘s motivation to execute an action and, thus, works as deterrence (Akers,
1990). Researchers have continuously refined DT over the years by adding further components to
punishment, such as formal and informal sanctions and as rewards, to explain not only illegal but also
noncompliant or undesired behavior (Akers, 1990; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).

9

PMT deals with motivating individuals to adopt recommended responses that come from messages
that focus on preventing noxious events from occurring. The theory suggests that individuals adopt a
recommended response based on the amount of protection motivation. Thus, the perception of threat,
which threat severity and occurrence probability describe, and the perception of efficacy of the
recommended response influence protection motivation (Rogers, 1975).

9

RChT suggests that individuals make rational decisions to take illegal or noncompliant action by
balancing the perceived costs and benefits of the action in question (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996).

3

Protection
motivation theory
(PMT)
Rational choice
theory (RChT)

RT suggests that ―people become motivationally aroused by a threat to or elimination of a behavioral
Reactance theory
freedom‖ (Brehm, 1989, p. 72). As a result, individuals try to restore their freedom, which can lead to
(RT)
undesired behavior (Brehm, 1989).
Theory of
reasoned action
(TRA)

TRA, a predecessor of the TPB, explains intention just with two factors: attitude and subjective norms
(Ajzen, 1991).
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Table 2. Theories Used to Explain IT Security Behavior in the Literature
General theory of The theory posits that individuals with low self-control are more likely to engage in criminal acts than
crime (GTC)
individuals with high self-control (Akers, 1991).

2

Social cognitive
(learning) theory
(SCT)

In the SCT, three categories of factors (behavioral patterns, environmental influences, and internal
personal factors) and the causal, bi-directional relationships between them explain human behavior
(Bandura, 2001).

2

Neutralization
theory (NT)

NT suggests that people justify (or neutralize) their criminal or deviant behavior by applying different
neutralization techniques (also called rationalizations) (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

2

(Organizational) CT explains the main different forms of organizational control and the conditions under which these
Control theory (CT) forms occur (Ouchi & Maguire, 1975).
Knowledge,
attitude and
behavior (KAB)
model

The model explains the relationship between its constructs (knowledge, attitude, and behavior)
(Schrader & Lawless, 2004).

2

2

―The HBM hypothesizes that health-related action depends upon...three classes of factors:
1) ...Sufficient motivation (or health concern) to make health issues salient or relevant.
2) The belief that one is susceptible (vulnerable) to a serious health problem.... This [belief] is often
Health belief model
termed perceived threat.
(HBM)
3) The belief that following a particular health recommendation would be beneficial in reducing the
perceived threat, and at a subjectively-acceptable cost. Cost refers to perceived barriers that
must be overcome in order to follow the health recommendation‖ (Rosenstock, Strecher, &
Becker, 1988, p. 177).

2

Self-determination
theory (SDT) /
organismic
integration theory
(OIT)

The theory suggests that ―if external prompts are used by significant others...to encourage people to
do an uninteresting activity…, the individuals will tend to internalize the activity‘s initially external
regulation. ...People will tend to take in the regulation and integrate it with their sense of self.‖ (Deci &
Ryan, 2002, p. 15).

2

EPPM is a fear appeal theory that explains the relationship between threat and efficacy of the
response to the threat. The theory ―claims that perceived efficacy determines whether danger control
accesses or fear control processes are initiated, and perceived threat determine the intensity of these
Extended parallel
responses. ...Danger control processes are primarily cognition processes where individuals evaluate
process model
their susceptibility to the threat, the severity of the threat, their ability to perform the recommended
(EPPM)
response (perceived self-efficacy), and the effectiveness of the recommended response (perceived
response efficacy). ...Fear control processes are defined as primarily emotional processes where
people respond to and cope with their fear, not to danger.‖ (Witte, 1992, p. 337 f.).

2

Organizational
climate (OC)

Organizational climate refers to ―the shared meaning organizational members attach to the events,
policies, practices, and procedures they experience and the behaviors they see being rewarded,
supported, and expected…. It helps [them to] understand important effectiveness outcomes that are
conceptually seen to emerge from the climate.‖ (Ehrhart, Schneider, & Macey, 2014, p. 2 f.).

2

TAM tries to explain the causes of individuals' accepting or rejecting technology. It uses two
Technology
determinates for this reason: perceived usefulness (PU) (i.e., ―the extent they believe it will help them
acceptance model
perform their job better‖) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) (i.e., ―the degree to which a person
(TAM)
believes that using a particular system would be free of effort‖) (Davis, 1989, p. 320).

2

Expectancy-value According to EVT, beliefs about the consequences of performing a certain behavior and the evaluation
theory (EVT)
of these consequences form the attitude towards the behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 30 f.).

1

Researchers have used involvement theories in different domains, which has resulted in different
Involvement theory conceptual models for explaining involvement (Andrews, Durvasula, & Akhter, 1990; Astin, 1999;
(IT)
Huang, Chou, & Lin, 2010). The theories suggest that the level of involvement influences an
individual‘s motivation and, thus, the level of engagement in a certain act.

1

Risk
compensation/
homeostasis
theory (RCT)

In RCT, also called risk homeostasis theory, two variables (target level of risk (i.e., the level of risk
individuals consider acceptable or are willing to take) and perceived level of risk) explain individuals‘
risk-taking behavior. The theory suggests that, if a discrepancy between the two variables exists,
individuals will adjust their behavior to eliminate the discrepancy. (Wilde, 1998)

1

CRT explains counterproductive or deviant behavior based on the cognitive processing of workplace
events. The cognitive processing comprises two stages: 1) an individual perceives some type of
Causal reasoning disequilibrium (e.g., injustice or inequity) and 2) the individual makes an attribution for the
theory (CRT)
disequilibrium. If the individual assigns external and stable reasons to the disequilibrium, then the
individual is more likely to engage in counterproductive behavior (Martinko, Gundlach, & Douglas,
2002).

1
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Table 2. Theories Used to Explain IT Security Behavior in the Literature

Elaboration
likelihood model
(ELM)

ELM deals with how individuals process messages. According to it, when people have to react to a
persuasive message, they can take one of two possible routes: the central or peripheral route.
Individuals take the central route when they have the motivation to and can scrutinize a message.
Individuals take the peripheral route when they lack the motivation and/or the ability to scrutinize a
message. As such, factors that lie in the persuasion context (e.g., number of arguments, attractive
source) influence the peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

1

Preventive
adoption model
(PAM)

PAM describes the antecedents of individual intentions to engage in preventive information security
behaviors. It integrates constructs from preventive health behavior theories (specifically from the PMT
and the HBM) and the TPB with constructs from the IS technology acceptance literature (Wynn,
Karahanna, Williams, & Madupalli, 2012, p. 5).

1

Structural
empowerment
model (SEM)

SEM suggests that ―power is derived from the structural conditions in an organization‖. Such structural
conditions include ―access to opportunity, access to information, and participation in decision-making‖
(Talib & Dhillon, 2015, p. 5).

1

TL ―involves inspiring followers to commit to a shared vision and goals for an organization‖ (Bass &
Riggio, 2006, p. 4).

1

The theory suggests that motivation explains choices an individual makes among different voluntary
responses. Individuals make choices based on valence (i.e., „affective orientations towards particular
outcomes‖) and outcome expectancy (i.e., the probability that the outcomes will result from a particular
act) (Vroom, 1964, p. 15-17).

1

DTI refers to individuals‘ inability to perform two tasks concurrently. The ―tasks [can] interfere with each
Dual-task
other quite drastically, even though they are neither intellectually challenging nor physically
interference (DTI)
incompatible‖ (Pashler, 1994, p. 220).

1

Transformational
leadership (TL)
Expectancy
valence theory
(EVcT)

Agency theory
(AT)

3.2

AT tries to explain the agency relationship in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another
(the agent) who performs that work. The theory ―is concerned with resolving two problems that can
occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals
of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the
agent is actually doing.‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58).

1

Classifying Relevant Factors

As we state in Section 2.2, we use the KAB model as a framework to classify the factors that affect the
success of SETA programs. We found that a significant number of papers focused on explaining the two
KAB model constructs attitude and behavior. However, the majority concentrated on another factor—
intention—to explain human compliance or noncompliance in the context of IT security (see Table A1).
Two reasons may explain why so many papers concentrated on intention rather than on behavior or
attitude. First, according to the TPB, which researchers have widely used to explain human behavior in
general and in the specific context of IT security, intention is the main predecessor of behavior (Ajzen
1991). Second, one cannot easily empirically evaluate actual behavior. While one can test intention using
questionnaires with a rather large sample of people, objective evaluating actual behavior requires one to
observe people‘s activities—a difficult task (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010). Questionnairebased empirical (self-reporting) tests on actual behavior are problematic because individuals naturally
avoid reporting deviant behavior (Chu, Chau, & So, 2015; Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling, 2011). Intention,
however, cannot sufficiently predict actual behavior because having the intention to comply with
organizational IT security does not necessarily mean that actual compliant behavior will occur (Komatsu,
Takagi, & Takemura, 2013; Merritt & Dhillon, 2016). Due to these reasons, we extend the KAB model by
adding intention as a fourth dimension (see Figure 1).

Knowledge

Intention

Behavior

Attitude
Figure 1. Knowledge, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior Model

Volume 19

Issue 4

Paper 4

63

Factors that Affect the Success of Security Education, Training, and Awareness Programs: A Literature Review

In Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4, we explain which factors in the literature influence each dimension (i.e.,
knowledge, attitude, intention, and behavior) in the extended model. In doing so, we also depict the
relations and the influencing directions between the different factors. We summarize the analysis in
Tables 3 to 6. The tables include factors with both a direct and indirect impact on each dimension.
Additionally, we propose several subdimensions that apply only to the factors with a direct impact. With
this classification, we provide a comprehensive view of relevant factors that affect the success of SETA
programs. Therefore, it contains duplicates (i.e., factors that influence more than one dimension or have
both a direct or indirect impact appear more than once).

3.2.1

Factors that Influence Knowledge

As we explain in Section 2, SETA programs provide individuals with general IT security knowledge and
skills to cope with IT security issues properly and knowledge about an organization‘s IT security policy.
Previous research in different domains has shown that knowledge alone has a rather weak effect on
behavior (Schrader & Lawless, 2004). In the IT security domain in particular, Tarwireyi et al. (2011) and
Parsons et al. (2014) have also shown the same weak correlation between knowledge and behavior,
which may explain why most of the literature we reviewed concentrated on motivational factors in
connection to attitude and intention rather than on knowledge. However, based on the results in the
studies we reviewed, we can see that several factors play an important role in increasing learning effects.
We can divide these factors into two main groups: 1) factors that focus on SETA programs‘ content and 2)
factors that pertain to creating and distributing knowledge. Responsibility represents an important factor
related to SETA programs‘ content (Alhogail, Mirza, & Bakry, 2015; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen,
2015; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Information about responsibilities should describe not only the
responsibilities themselves but also how the organization will monitor and control activities related to these
responsibilities and how it will sanction and reward compliant and noncompliant behavior (Alhogail et al.,
2015). A SETA program should provide this information in a persuasive and comprehensible way, which
means that it needs to consider the comprehension level of an organization‘s members (Alhogail et al.,
2015; Komatsu et al., 2013). Furthermore, such a program should use respectful language to deliver the
information; otherwise, reactance can occur (Lowry & Moody, 2015). Further, this information should
clearly define employees‘ role vis-à-vis technical measures in order to reduce the negative impact that
perceived technical protection has on behavior (Zhang et al., 2009), which we explain more in Section 3.2.3.
Sohrabi Safa, von Solms, & Furnell (2016) identified four factors that, when in an organization, increase its
employees‘ information security awareness and knowledge: knowledge sharing, collaboration, intervention
and experience. Knowledge sharing refers to distributing skills, knowledge, and experience. In addition to
distributing knowledge, collaboration refers to reviewing and commenting on it to improve its quality.
Intervention refers to participation in rather informal meetings and group discussions that focus on sharing
knowledge and experience. Unlike approaches (e.g., formal presentations, posters, messages and emails), which involve one-way communication, active participation and group processes can improve IT
security awareness among employees in the short term and, thus, lead to changes in their security
behavior (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010). Experience with security incidents and with measures to deal
with the incidents provides an important source of knowledge. An organization can increase the
experience that employees gain by letting them actively participate in IT security (Sohrabi Safa et al.,
2016). Therefore, a SETA program should motivate and provide a suitable platform for an organization‘s
members to enable them to share knowledge, collaborate, intervene in security-related issues, and gain
experience. Table 3 summarizes the factors that influence knowledge.
Table 3. Factors that Influence Knowledge
Dimension

Subdimension

Factor with direct influence

Content

Role and responsibilities of individuals
Role of technical measures
Consequences
Persuasiveness
Comprehensibility
Respectful language

Creation/distribution

Knowledge sharing
Collaboration
Intervention
Experience

Knowledge
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Factors that Influence Attitude

Attitude, a construct of human behavior, refers to the degree to which an individual favorably or
unfavorably evaluates a certain behavior (Ajzen, 1991). In the context of IT security compliance, the study
of Sohrabi Safa et al. (2016) identified three relevant factors that can influence attitude: involvement in
security issues, commitment to organizational policies and plans, and personal norms. Based on the
context in which they conducted their study, the authors defined the latter as beliefs in the importance of
organizational information assets (Sohrabi Safa et al., 2016).
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) identified two categories of factors that influence attitude towards security
compliance. The first category, which has a direct impact on attitude, comprises individual‘s beliefs about
the individual‘s overall assessment of the consequences of compliance and noncompliance. This category
has three underlying factors: perceived benefit of compliance, perceived cost of compliance, and
perceived cost of noncompliance. The second category, beliefs about the outcomes of compliance and
noncompliance, influence the first category. Intrinsic benefit (e.g., satisfaction, accomplishment,
fulfillment), safety (which refers to making information resources safe), and rewards all affect perceived
benefit of compliance. Kajtazi and Bulgurcu (2013) also showed that safety has a direct positive effect on
compliance attitude. According to Bulgurcu et al. (2010), the factor work impediment affects perceived
cost of compliance and refers to the perception that compliance can hinder business functioning.
However, Kajtazi and Bulgurcu (2013) found results that partially contradict these findings since they
could not find empirical evidence that work impediment has a direct negative impact on employees‘
compliance attitude. As for perceived costs of noncompliance, relevant influencing factors include
punishment, intrinsic cost (which in this case involve guilt, embarrassment, shame), and vulnerability of
information resources (Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
Researchers have also found two other factors to be positively associated with individuals‘ attitude
towards information security: 1) organizational information security culture (i.e., the shared beliefs and
values among colleagues in the workplace concerning information security) (Rocha Flores & Ekstedt,
2016) and 2) individuals‘ perceived fairness of security policies‘ requirements (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, &
Benbasat, 2009).
The OIT focuses on explaining individuals‘ motivations in a specific context. It distinguishes between:
Extrinsic motivation including external regulation as measured by the construct external
[perceived locus of causality (PLOC)]…and identification and integration as measured by
internal PLOC…. The more an extrinsic motivation is internalized, the more autonomous an
individual will perceive her/his behavior. (Kranz & Haeussinger, 2014, p. 3)
In the context of information security compliance, an external PLOC means that an individual complies
due to external pressure (e.g., sanctions) and an internal PLOC means that an individual complies due to
the individual‘s own values and personal beliefs. Kranz and Haeussinger (2014) found both internal and
external PLOC to positively influence individuals‘ compliance attitude.
Several studies also investigated another important factor; namely, awareness. As we state earlier in the
paper, among their goals, SETA programs focus on raising individuals‘ IT security awareness. Information
security awareness (Al-Omari & El-Gayar, 2012; Bauer & Bernroider, 2017; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Rocha
Flores & Ekstedt, 2016) and technology awareness (Al-Omari & El-Gayar, 2012; Dinev & Hu, 2007) are
significant predecessors of individuals‘ attitude towards applying security measures and complying with
security policies.
The factors we have identified for this dimension show the correlation between knowledge and attitude: in
order to positively influence individuals‘ attitude toward compliance with organizational IT security, certain
knowledge should exist (i.e., knowledge about security policies and knowledge about the importance of
information and IT assets to the organization). This knowledge can enable individuals to create an opinion
about the possible consequences of their actions and, thus, form an attitude towards compliance or
noncompliance. Individuals can achieve knowledge via training, which research has also found to have a
positive direct effect on attitude (Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013). An organization needs to adequately and
equally inform all individuals because information asymmetry has a negative effect on their security
compliance attitude (Kajtazi & Bulgurcu, 2013).
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Table 4. Factors that Influence Attitude
Dimension

Subdimension

Factor with direct influence

Factor with indirect influence /
explaining factor

Knowledge
Involvement
Commitment
Personal norms
Awareness (of information security and
technology)
Training
Information asymmetry
Organizational information security
culture
Perceived fairness (of the requirements
of security policies)
Internal and external perceived locus of
causality

Attitude

Beliefs about overall
assessment of
consequences

Perceived benefit of compliance

Intrinsic benefit
Safety (of IT resources)
Rewards

Perceived cost of compliance

Work impediment

Perceived cost of noncompliance

Intrinsic cost
Punishment
Vulnerability (of IT resources)

Safety

3.2.3

Factors that Influence Intention

As we explain in Section 3.2, the majority of papers we examined studied intention more than any other
behavior construct in the context of IT security compliance. Zhang et al. (2009) and Bulgurcu et al. (2010)
tested the influence that the TPB constructs attitude, subjective norms (also referred to as normative
beliefs (Bulgurcu et al. 2010)), and perceived behavioral control had on the intention to comply with
security policies. Subjective norms describe ―the perceived social pressure to perform or not to perform [a
certain] behavior‖ and perceived behavior control means ―the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the
behavior‖ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). Researchers have found that attitude (Al-Omari & El-Gayar, 2012; Bauer
& Bernroider, 2017; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013; Kranz & Haeussinger, 2014; Rocha
Flores & Ekstedt, 2016), subjective norms (Al-Omari & El-Gayar, 2012; Bauer & Bernroider, 2017;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013; Kim & Kim, 2017; Kranz & Haeussinger, 2014; Rocha
Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Wynn et al., 2012), and perceived behavior control (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Jenkins
& Durcikova, 2013) have a significant influence on the intention to perform preventive security behaviors
and comply with security policies. However, another study found that subjective norms and attitude did not
significantly influence the intention to misuse IT resources (Chu et al., 2015).
Whereas Zhang et al. (2009) formulate two underlying factors to explain perceived behavior control
(perceived availability of resources and self-efficacy), Bulgurcu et al. (2010) argue that self-efficacy can
solely replace perceived behavior control because they measure the same construct. The latter define
self-efficacy as an individual‘s judging whether the individual has the necessary skills and knowledge to
perform the behavior in question. For our classification, we use both explaining factors that Zhang et al.
(2009) suggest because we consider that, in addition to knowledge and skills, the availability of resources
such as time and technical support can positively influence the intention to comply with organizational IT
security. Additionally, many studies have confirmed that self-efficacy influences intention (Al-Omari & ElGayar, 2012; Johnston et al., 2015; Johnston, Wech, Jack, & Beavers, 2010; Kranz & Haeussinger, 2014;
Nguyen & Kim, 2017; Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Warkentin, Johnston, Walden, & Straub, 2016).
However, some studies have not found support for it (Pahnila, Karjalainen, & Siponen, 2013; Putri &
Hovav, 2014; Wynn et al., 2012).
Similar to the factor perceived availability of resources and perceived costs of compliance (which we
discuss in connection with attitude), perceived response costs influence the intention such that, when an
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individual perceives the costs to perform a secure behavior as low, the individual will be more likely to
perform the behavior (Warkentin, Mcbride, Carter, & Johnston, 2012). The perception of response efficacy
is also a significant predecessor of intention in that, if an individual perceives that the individual can
effectively implement security measures or comply with security policies, then a positive intention towards
these behaviors will arise (Johnston et al., 2015; Komatsu et al., 2013; Pahnila et al., 2013; Putri & Hovav,
2014; Warkentin et al., 2016; Wynn et al., 2012).
Perceived psychological empowerment derived from SEM also represents another factor that positively
influences the intention to comply with security policies (Talib & Dhillon, 2015). Empowerment refers to
―increased intrinsic task motivation‖ (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990, p. 666). In the context of security
compliance, individuals can achieve psychological empowerment via SETA programs, access to
information regarding security strategies and goals, and participate in security decision making.
Johnston et al. (2015) argue that the perception of threat should include both threat to IT/information
assets and threat to the individual in order for the PMT to apply in the IT security context because
noncompliance to IT security poses a threat first to the IT/information assets and the PMT deals with
threats to an individual. Therefore, the term perceived threat refers to the threat to IT/information assets,
whereas sanctions describe the threat to the individual.
Johnston et al. (2015) and Pahnila et al. (2013) found that perceived threat severity had a strong effect on
the intention to implement security policies and perform security measure, whereas Warkentin et al.
(2016) and Wynn et al. (2012) could not find evidence for a strong influence. Some studies have also
found perceived threat susceptibility (also referred to as perceived threat vulnerability) to have a
significant effect on the policy violation intention (Johnston, Warkentin, McBride, & Carter, 2016;
Warkentin et al., 2016), and while others found that it had no significant impact (Warkentin et al., 2012).
Concerning the perception of one‘s own actions, Wynn et al. (2012) show that the perceived compatibility
of a security behavior with an individual‘s work practices and the perceived ease of use of security
behaviors positively influence the intention to perform secure behavior. These results partially contradict
what Dinev and Hu (2007) found: that both TAM constructs, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of
use, had no significant influence on the intention to use protective technologies. Reflective autonomy,
which positively influences security policy compliance intention, represents another relevant factor in this
context. The reflective autonomy construct comes from SDT/OIT and ―refers to an individual‘s belief that
his/her actions are self-guided through considerate thought and reflection‖ (Wall & Palvia, 2013, p. 1).
Zhang et al. (2009) identified another relevant factor that they call perceived technical security protection.
They argue that one should not examine human behavior independently of technical security measures
and, based on the RCT, hypothesize that perceived technical security protection has a negative impact on
human security compliance intention because the perception of more protection leads to one to behave
less cautiously. If, for instance, an organization introduced additional technical security measures to a
system that individuals already considered secure, it would make individuals behave less carefully
(Stewart, 2004). In their empirical analysis, Zhang et al. (2009) found both that perceived technical
protection had both a positive (indirect via influencing perceive behavioral control) and negative (direct)
effect on intention.
Researchers identified perceived benefit of noncompliance, a complex factor, to significantly influence
intention in the context of IT security compliance. The benefit can be either intrinsic or extrinsic, though
perceived intrinsic benefit has a greater effect on intention than extrinsic (Hu et al., 2011). Moral beliefs
and self-control influence perceived benefit of noncompliance (Hu et al., 2011). Moral belief, another
construct of the RChT (e.g., in the model of Paternoster and Simpson (1996)), formulates intention
independently of individuals‘ belief about the outcomes (costs and benefits) of certain behavior. Moral
beliefs describe an individual‘s evaluation or judgment about whether a certain behavior is right or wrong
(Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Hu et al. (2011) found that moral beliefs negatively influenced the
perceived intrinsic benefit of noncompliance and, thus, had a positive influence on the intention to comply.
Similar to moral beliefs, the factor internal PLOC (which we discuss already in Section 3.2.2 in connection
to attitude) had a positive effect on the intention to comply with security policies (Kranz & Haeussinger,
2014). Gottfredson and Hirschi‘s (1995) GTC uses self-control as a main construct to explain criminal
behavior. As Table 2 describes, the theory posits that individuals with low self-control are more likely to
engage in criminal acts than individuals with high self-control (Akers, 1991). Low self-control refers to ―the
inability to consider the long-term consequences of one‘s act‖ (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1995, p. 32) and
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positively influences the perceived benefit of noncompliance and, thus, has a negative effect on the
intention to comply (Hu et al., 2011).
The DT focuses on the next relevant factor we identified for this domain: deterrence. Siponen and Vance
(2010) examined the influence that formal sanctions (e.g., punishment, codes of ethics), informal
sanctions (e.g., disapproval of peers), and shame had on employees‘ intention to violate organizational
security policies and concluded that only informal sanctions had a significant influence. In addition, D‘Arcy
et al. (2009) identified perceived certainty and perceived severity of sanctions as relevant factors that
influence employees‘ intention to misuse information systems but that perceived severity had a greater
influence than perceived certainty. These results concur with both Johnston et al.‘s (2015) and Hu et al.‘s
(2011) results: the former found that informal sanction severity and certainty had a significant influence on
intention, and the latter found that formal sanction (specifically punishment) severity, formal sanction
certainty, and shame had no significant impact on intention. Additionally, without distinguishing between
formal and informal sanctions, Ifinedo (2016), Johnston et al. (2016), and Warkentin et al. (2012) found
that sanction severity had a positive influence on the compliance intention and a negative effect on the
policy violation intention. Further, Johnston et al. (2016) confirmed that high sanction certainty had a
negative effect on the policy violation intention.
User awareness of security policies, SETA programs, and computer monitoring represent further
deterrence techniques that significantly influence the perception of sanctions and, thus, the intention to
misuse IS (D‘Arcy et al., 2009). Furthermore, information security awareness (Johnston et al., 2010) and
technology awareness (Dinev & Hu, 2007) have positive effects on compliance intention and the intention
to use protective technologies, respectively. In the context of security awareness and knowledge, Kim and
Kim (2017) tested the influence that compliance knowledge had on compliance intention. They defined
this factor as ―an employee‘s judgment of personal skills and knowledge about fulfilling the requirements
of the laws and regulations‖ (p. 990) and found that it had a positive effect on the intention.
However, interpersonal and organizational factors can strongly affect the impact that deterrence and
especially sanctions have on intention (Siponen & Vance, 2010). NT provides one group of such factors.
Siponen and Vance (2010) identified six relevant neutralization techniques in the security violation
context: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, defense of necessity, condemnation of the condemners
(i.e., neutralizing actions by blaming the target of the actions, such as violating information security
policies because they are unreasonable), appeal to higher loyalties (e.g., violating policy in order to get
work done), and the metaphor of the ledger (i.e., compensating bad acts with good acts, such as
compensating occasional violation of security policies with general adherence to them). With the presence
of these techniques, sanctions lose their significant influence on the violation intention, which means that
neutralization has a significant impact on the intention to violate security policies (Siponen & Vance, 2010)
or on noncompliant intention (Bauer & Bernroider, 2017).
Researchers derived three further factors from the CT: organizational formal control, mandatoriness, and
reactance (Lowry & Moody, 2015). Organizational formal control includes all formal structures and
measures in an organization that serve to monitor, evaluate, and correct behavior in a desired direction
(Lowry & Moody, 2015; Ouchi, 1979). Generally, an organizational IT security policy should define
organizational formal control with regard to IT security. Mandatoriness refers to the degree to which
individuals perceive (in this case IT security) policies and procedures as being compulsory (Boss, Kirsch,
Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009). Reactance, which the RT explains, refers to a behavior or emotional
state. Factors that can invoke reactance to a security policy include a threat to freedom that results from
the policy and reactance proneness. Organizational formal control and mandatoriness can positively
influence the intention to comply with security policies. However, noncompliance can arise from reactance
if individuals experience security policies as a threat to freedom and if they are prone to reactance (Lowry
& Moody, 2015; Putri & Hovav, 2014; Wall & Palvia, 2013).
By combing and extending PMT and HBM, Hwang, Kim, Kim, and Kim (2017) identified three further
factors that had a negative effect on the intention to comply with security policies: work impediment,
security system anxiety (which refers to the fear to use IS when an organization adopts excessively strict
policies), and peer noncompliance. However, as Lebek, Guhr, and Breitner (2014) note, the following
―positive‖ factors can confront these ―negative‖ factors: transformational leadership, security motivation,
and perceived organizational security climate. These authors found that these factors had a significant
positive influence on employees‘ intentions to comply with security policies and participate in security
activities. Transformational leadership means to inspire people to commit to an organization‘s vision and
goals (see Table 2). Information security climate refers to ―employees‘ perceptions of management and
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organizational approaches to information security, which helps employees to make sense of the priority
accorded to information security within the organization‖ (Lebek et al., 2014, p. 7). Ifinedo (2016)
confirmed that organizational climate and, especially, top management support and beliefs related to
security issues had a positive influence on compliance intention.
Table 5. Factors that Influence Intention
Dimension

Subdimension

Factor with direct influence

Factor with indirect influence / explaining factor

Attitude
Subjective/social norms
Perceived availability of resources
Perceived behavioral control

Perceived self-efficacy
Perceived technical security protection

Perceived response efficacy
Perceived compatibility
Perceived ease of use
Perceived technical security protection
Intrinsic and extrinsic benefits
Perceived benefit of noncompliance

Moral beliefs
Self-control

Internal PLOC
Perceived response costs
Perceived threat severity
Perceived threat susceptibility/
vulnerability
SETA programs
Perceived psychological empowerment

Access to security strategies‘ information
Participation in security decision making

Reflective autonomy
Work impediment
Intention

Security system anxiety
Noncompliance of peers
Transformational leadership
Motivation
Perceived organizational security
climate

Top management support and beliefs

Trust in sender

IT skills

Organizational formal control
Mandatoriness (of IT security policies
and procedures)
Organizational
control / deterrence

Reactance
Informal sanctions

Threat to freedom
Reactance proneness
Perceived certainty
Perceived severity

Awareness of security policies
SETA programs
Denial of responsibility
Denial of injury
Neutralization /
rationalization

Defense of necessity
Condemnation of the condemners
Appeal to higher loyalties
The metaphor of the ledger
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Trust in sender represents the last factor we identified to have a strong impact on the intention to comply
with IT security (Komatsu et al., 2013). Researchers derived the factor from the ELM, and it affects
individuals with low IT skills. When individuals do not have the knowledge and skills necessary to evaluate
a certain message (e.g., to implement a certain security measure), the trust they have in the sender of the
message will positively influence their intention to fulfill what the message requests.
To sum up, intention represents a complex construct that SETA programs can only partially address
because some influencing factors, such as self-control, are interpersonal aspects that develop at an early
age and remain rather stable over the years (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1995). Further, an individual‘s
environment causes or affects other factors, such as moral beliefs, which means that such a program
needs to implement different measures not connected to the IT security domain to change their influence
in a desired direction. Nevertheless, we can derive several implications from analyzing the literature with
regard to SETA programs. First, knowledge represents an important predecessor of intention, especially
when a program provides employees with information and skills to implement certain measures, to
understand the role of information and IT assets and how they can damage these assets, to understand
the role of technical security protection, and to understand their individual responsibility. Control
mechanisms, such as computer monitoring and sanctions, can also influence the intention. However, a
program needs to clearly define these mechanisms‘ goals and roles and properly communicate them
throughout the organization so that they will not motivate (e.g., through reactance) noncompliant behavior.
Organizational conditions such as climate, top management support, peers‘ behavior represent crucial
factors for whether a SETA programs will succeed because they significantly impact the intention to fulfill
security requirements and goals.

3.2.4

Factors that Influence Behavior

Many theories across nearly all domains investigate behavior. The papers we reviewed applied 11
different theories (apart from the KAB model) to identify factors that directly affect behavior towards
compliance or noncompliance with IT security. We can divide the relevant factors into three categories.
The first category, which we call environmental factors, concerns an organization‘s environment and an
individual‘s own private environment. The second category, which we call cognitive and interpersonal
processes, concerns an individual‘s cognitive and interpersonal processes. Researchers derived these
two categories from the SCT (Alhogail et al., 2015). However, other factors that affect behavior towards
compliance and noncompliance with IT security and involve aspects related to both an individual‘s
environmental context and cognitive processes exist as well. Since one cannot assign these factors to
either the environmental or the cognitive category, we define a third category for these factors that we call
perception of environmental influences.
Relevant environmental factors with a positive influence on behavior include culture (national and
organizational), standards and regulations (in the security domain, which includes relevant government
laws), practices (e.g., management support and involvement in information security issues), security
policy (existence and comprehensiveness), and communication (Alhogail et al., 2015). Furthermore,
formal organizational control (e.g., monitoring individuals‘ computer activities) has a positive influence on
behavior because it can prevent deviant behavior (Ifinedo & Idemudia, 2017). Security systems, security
education, and security visibility in an organization also have a positive effect on behavior through
preventing noncompliant behavior (Hwang et al., 2017).
Other influencing factors include punishment and ethics training. Punishment certainty and severity have a
negative influence on employees‘ participation in nonmalicious but deviant information security behavior
(Ifinedo & Idemudia, 2017). Additionally, Workman and Gathegi (2007) examined how attitude towards the
law, social norms (also called social influences), and self-control (instead of perceived behavioral control)
influenced the effects that punishment and ethics training (i.e., approaches to deterrence) had on
employees‘ participation in deviant information security behavior. They found that punishment effectively
influenced individuals who followed rules to avoid negative consequences (i.e., their attitude toward the
law) and had low self-control, whereas ethics training effectively influenced individuals who followed rules
out of social conformity (i.e., their attitude toward the law and social norms) and had high self-control
(Workman & Gathegi, 2007). As for whether perceived behavioral control has a direct impact on secure
behavior, Merhi and Ahluwalia (2015) found that it did, but Jenkins and Durcikova (2013) did not.
Preparedness and responsibility represent two relevant factors of the cognitive and interpersonal
processes category. Preparedness combines both aspects of knowledge and awareness in itself (Alhogail
et al., 2015). Organizations can achieve it by using just-in-time reminders to overcome the effects of dual-
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task interference (Jenkins & Durcikova, 2013) and by providing their employees with information with a
good quality (Pahnila et al., 2013), which represent other environmental factors that influence secure
behavior. We depict responsibility‘s importance in connection with knowledge and attitude in Section 3.2.1
and Section 3.2.2, respectively. In addition, Alhogail et al. (2015) found that individuals will not necessarily
perform their responsibilities just because they know about them. In order for a desired behavior to occur,
individuals should also accept their responsibilities, which means they should be willing to behave in
accordance with their organization‘s information security policies and requirements. Furthermore,
monitoring and control, affect responsibility, so an organization should properly implement them in order to
not negatively impact behavior. An organization should also reward individuals who take responsibility and
sanction those who deny it to motivate compliant behavior (Alhogail et al., 2015).
Risk propensity represents another relevant interpersonal factor. It refers to ―an individual[‘s] current
tendency to take risk‖ (p. 4950) and influences secure behavior negatively (Nguyen & Kim, 2017).
By combining the PMT and ELM, Komatsu et al. (2013) identified several factors that influence behavior,
some of which we introduce earlier in the paper in connection with the other dimensions of our framework.
They divide the factors into positive factors: negative factors and factors for collective coping behavior.
Positive factors refer to factors that motivate an individual to cope with threats and involve perceived
response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy. Chen (2017), Huang, Parolia, and Cheng (2016), Ng and
Xu (2007) and Nguyen and Kim (2017) have also examined and established self-efficacy‘s positive effect
on behavior. Negative factors refer to factors that invoke a perception of threat and involve perceived
threat severity, perceived probability of occurrence/perceived susceptibility, and perceived cost (i.e., costs
that can arise as a consequence of the threat to the organization, such as lost data) (Komatsu et al.,
2013). From their empirical test, Komatsu et al. (2013) found that perceived threat severity and perceived
costs promoted secure behavior. These results partially contradict to the results that Ng and Xu (2007)
found: that perceived threat susceptibility but not perceived threat severity have a positive effect on secure
behavior. Perceived threat severity and susceptibility generally trigger fear in individuals. High fear of the
consequences of security threats impacts secure behavior negatively because it leads to inaction and
avoidance of secure behavior (Chen, 2017). Additionally, Ng and Xu (2007) investigated individuals‘
perceived benefit of practicing computer security (which one can also refer to as perceived benefit of
compliance) on secure behavior and found that it had a significant positive effect.
The third category (i.e., factors for collective coping behavior) assumes individuals collectively, not
individually, cope with security issues in an organization and includes the responsibility and social norms
that we present earlier and the perceived ratio of others implementing IT security measures (Komatsu et
al., 2013). Merhi and Ahluwalia (2015) also confirmed that social norms have a positive effect on
compliance behavior.
Further factors that influence actual behavior in the context of implementing IT security measures include
persuasiveness of message and level of comprehension. Persuasiveness of message, an environmental
factor, concerns the content of a message (e.g., a security policy) that comes from the organization. Level
of comprehension, which concerns an individual‘s cognitive processes, depends on the IT skills and
degree of an individual‘s involvement in security incidents. However, Komatsu et al. (2013) found that
these factors influenced actual behavior only if intention was present, which suggests that intention
influences actual behavior indirectly.
Perceived lack of attributed trust represents another factor in this dimension (Posey, Bennett, & Roberts,
2011). Attributed trust refers to ―the degree with which an employee believes he or she is trusted by his or
her organization‖ (Posey et al., 2011, p. 487). In the context of IT security, Posey et al. (2011) suggest
that increased information security measures lead to employees‘ perceived lack of attributed trust and that
perceived lack of attributed trust leads to deviant behavior, such as information or computer abuse.
Environmental and interpersonal factors form perceived lack of trust. Relevant environmental factors
include mechanistic organizational structure and perceived uncertainty of management style. Mechanistic
organizational structure features high bureaucracy and less flexibility. Perceived uncertainty of
management style pertains to an employee‘s beliefs ―that management‘s future actions will be
unpredictable, surprising, and filled with uncertainty‖ (Posey et al., 2011, p. 488). Relevant interpersonal
factors include negative affectivity (i.e., which concerns constantly concentrate on the negative aspects of
daily life) and external assignment tendency (i.e., individuals‘ tendency to assign negative events to others
rather than themselves).

Volume 19

Issue 4

Paper 4

71

Factors that Affect the Success of Security Education, Training, and Awareness Programs: A Literature Review

The factors we discuss in this section until now are mostly based on an individual‘s rational decision
making process. However, an unintentional emotional act that occurs as a consequence of a desire to
misuse can also cause noncompliant behavior. The desire to misuse, an interpersonal factor that attitude
and perceived behavioral control impact, influences the behavior to misuse indirectly (through intention)
and directly (Chu et al., 2015).
Table 6. Factors that Influence Behavior
Dimension

Subdimension

Factor with direct influence

Factor with indirect influence / explaining factor

Culture
Standards and regulations
Practices
Security policy
Security systems
Security education
Security visibility
Communication
Environment

Attitude towards law
Punishment

Self-control
Attitude towards law and social norms

Ethics training
Formal organizational control
Just-in-time reminders
Information quality
Persuasiveness of message

Intention

Knowledge/preparedness
Perceived self-efficacy
Intention
Level of comprehension
Behavior

IT skills
Involvement
Acceptance of responsibility

Cognitive/interpersonal
processes

Responsibility

Monitoring and control
Reward and sanctions
Intention

Fear
Attitude

Desire

Perceived behavioral control

Perceived benefit of compliance
Risk propensity
Intention

Desire
Perceived uncertainty of management style

Perceived lack of attributed trust

Mechanistic organizational structure
Negative affectivity
External assignment tendency

Perception of
environmental
influences

Perceived social norms
Perceived ratio of others
Perceived response efficacy
Perceived threat severity

Intention

Perceived cost
Perceived threat susceptibility
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Finally, three studies focused on the direct impact of intention on secure behavior with controversial
results: Pahnila et al. (2013) and Bauer and Bernroider (2017) found a direct impact, whereas Jenkins and
Durcikova (2013) found no empirical evidence for a direct impact.
From analyzing the literature for factors that directly affect security behavior, we can see that SETA
programs provide a crucial means to change behavior. Organizations can achieve a positive and desirable
change in their employees‘ behavior via SETA programs if they take into consideration the factors we
discuss in this section and summarize in Table 6 when they design, develop, and implement such programs.

4

Conclusion and Research Agenda

While researchers have long recognized the importance of the human factor in the IT security context and
the relevance of SETA programs for managing it, different studies and current events question how much
one can control the human factor and SETA programs‘ effectiveness at doing so. In order for SETA
programs to be effective, they should consider the factors that influence individuals to comply or not
comply with IT security guidelines. In reviewing the literature, we found a significant number of such
factors that researchers have derived from different behavioral, decision making, and criminology theories.
However, we previously lacked work that has comprehensively reviewed and structured these factors. In
order to fill this gap, we systematically reviewed the literature and synthesized the results to conceptually
classify relevant factors that affect the success of SETA programs. The classification highlights the
importance of knowledge, awareness, and responsibility, which SETA programs can and should address.
However, it also contains environmental factors, such as management support and involvement, and
interpersonal factors, such as desire and rationalization, which SETA programs can only partially address
and, therefore, require additional measures. One can use our classification to derive fields of action and,
thus, develop modules for SETA programs that one can subsequently adjust and integrate depending on
the specific organizational context.
Our approach has several limitations. First, we concentrated on three databases when searching the
literature. We found only journal papers in two of the databases (Web of Science and EBSCOhost), so we
searched for papers from leading IS conferences in the third database. We did not consider conferences
that have a special focus on IT security or are from the organizational or psychological research domains.
Second, we only retained papers that contained theory-grounded and empirically evaluated factors and,
thus, excluded papers that could have delivered further explanatory factors (e.g., Farahmand & Spafford,
2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).
Based on the findings of our review, we suggest two main directions for future research in the IT security
compliance and SETA program domain.

4.1

Knowledge Creation and Distribution

Organizational information systems continue to become more complex for individuals and organizations
need to provide IT security-related information that matches employees‘ comprehension level. Therefore,
researchers should provide organizations with suitable approaches to measure their IT security
comprehension. These approaches should measure general IT comprehension as a pre-stage to IT
security comprehension. Thus, one needs to first operationalize the construct ―comprehension‖ in the IT
security context.
Proposition 1: How can one operationalize comprehension in the IT security context?
Proposition 2: How can one measure the level of IT security comprehension in an organization‘s
employees?
Furthermore, as different levels of IT security comprehension require different approaches to create and
distribute knowledge, we need research to investigate how suitably different knowledge creation and
distribution approaches address different levels of comprehension. To successfully impart knowledge, one
needs to balance information‘s difficulty for the recipient: in order to be intrinsically motivated, individuals
need to feel empowered (Talib & Dhillon, 2015) through knowledge and not overstrained.
Proposition 3: What methods allow one to create and distribute IT security knowledge to
individuals with low, medium, and high IT security understanding?
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Another important research direction concerns the distribution of IT security knowledge internally and
externally. Rashid, Zakaria, and Zulhemay (2013), for example, discuss the integration of information
security and knowledge management and argue its importance for the effectiveness of information
security. As such, one can regard the knowledge management field as a source for knowledge-creation
and -distribution approaches, and research should further investigate its applicability to the IT security
context. Considering that organizations can be unwilling to exchange IT security knowledge, we need to
examine the reasons that prevent organizations and individuals from sharing their knowledge and develop
methods to address them. Agrawal and Snekkenes (2017), for example, provide some promising findings
in this direction.
Proposition 4a: How can an organization organize the way in which it distributes knowledge?
Proposition 4b: How can organizations stimulate and organize interfirm knowledge sharing?

4.2

Organizational Integration of SETA Programs

The second research direction we believe researchers need to follow involves how organizations integrate
SETA programs. Generally, IT users consider IT security issues as the IT department‘s concern and
responsibility. Thus, IT users can perceive participating in an organization‘s IT security program as
additional work that costs much time an effort (Warkentin et al., 2012) or as a task that keeps them from
doing their work (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Thus, organizations need integration approaches that will
lower the perceived negative influence of participating in SETA programs, which research in the literature
often discusses as perceived costs of compliance.
Proposition 5: How can an organization integrate SETA programs into its employees‘ daily work
so that they do not perceive such programs as burdensome?
A SETA program forms part of an organization‘s overall security program. As such, an organization should
clearly define the SETA program‘s role in and connections to the remaining parts of the overall program
and make such information transparent for the organization‘s members. As the literature we analyzed
shows, organizations especially need to depict the interdependences between SETA programs and their
security goals, strategies, procedures, policies, and technical security protection. A proper approach to
achieve this goal could involve developing conceptual models.
Proposition 6:

What interdependences exist between a SETA program and the remaining
components of an overall organizational security program? How can one model
these interdependences?

As many studies show, organizational climate and culture (which includes factors such as management
style, support and attitude towards IT security, peers‘ involvement and attitudes, and organizational
structure) have an important influence on security-related behavior. Therefore, research should also
concentrate on how to create a proper climate, culture, and structures that support security-compliant
behavior.
Proposition 7a: How can organizations achieve a security culture?
Proposition 7b: What does a security-promoting climate entail, and how can an organization
achieve it?
Proposition 7c: What are security-promoting organizational structures, and how can organizations
build them?
We plan to conduct future research in two directions. First, we plan to determine which factors we
identified that SETA programs can address and to propose a suitable approach for designing, developing,
and implementing SETA programs. Second, we plan to examine what additional measures organizations
should take and how they should implement them to make SETA programs successful. To do so, we
believe that we will require innovative and unconventional approaches (Ruighaver, Maynard, & Chang,
2007) because organizational information systems continue to become more complex and
incomprehensible for individuals, which makes it difficult for organizations to keep their IT and IT security
competency current through conventional educational and awareness programs.
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Appendix A: Summary of Search Results
Table S1. Central Issues in the Reviewed Literature
Central issue

Examining factors that influence
employees‘ attitude towards compliance
with security policies or towards protective
technologies (10)

Examining factors that affect behavioral
intention towards
compliance/noncompliance with security
policies and procedures (24)

Examining factors that influence
employees‘ intention
towards protective technologies/to
implement security measures/
to perform preventive security behaviors
(5)

References

Applied theories

Al-Omari & El-Gayar (2012)

TPB

Bauer &Bernroider (2017)

KAB

Bulgurcu et al. (2009)

TPB, perceived fairness

Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

EVT, RChT

Dinev & Hu (2007)

TPB, TAM

Kajtazi & Bulgurcu (2013)

TPB, AT

Kranz & Haeussinger (2014)

SDT/OIT

Parsons et al. (2014)

KAB

Rocha Flores & Ekstedt (2016)

TPB (ISA, culture)

Sohrabi Safa et al. (2016)

SBT, IT

Al-Omari & El-Gayar (2012)

TPB

Bauer & Bernroider (2017)

TRA, NT

Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

TPB

D‘Arcy et al. (2009)

DT

Hu et al. (2011)

RChT, DT, TPB, GTC

Hwang et al. (2017)

HBM, PMT

Ifinedo (2016)

DT, RChT, OC

Jenkins & Durcikova (2013)

TPB

Johnston et al. (2010)

SCT

Johnston et al. (2015)

PMT, DT

Johnston et al. (2016)

PMT, DT

Kim & Kim (2017)

TPB

Kranz & Haeussinger (2014)

TPB, SDT/OIT

Lebek et al. (2014)

TL, OC, EVcT

Lowry & Moody (2015)

CT, RT

Pahnila et al. (2013)

PMT

Putri & Hovav (2014)

PMT, RT, OJ

Siponen & Vance (2010)

DT, NT

Sohrabi Safa et al. (2016)

Attitude (TPB)

Talib & Dhillon (2015)

SEM

Warkentin et al. (2012)

PMT, DT

Wall & Palvia (2013)

RT, SDT/OIT

Zhang et al. (2009)

TPB, RCT

Dinev & Hu (2007)

TPB, TAM

Komatsu et al. (2013)

PMT, ELM

Nguyen & Kim (2017)

TPB, TRA, self-efficacy (SCT)

Warkentin et al. (2016)

EPPM

Wynn et al. (2013)

PAM, PEOU (TAM)

Examining factors that influence
employees‘ intention to resist social
engineering (1)

Rocha Flores & Ekstedt (2016)

TPB
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Table S1. Central Issues in the Reviewed Literature

Identifying factors that influence actual
behavior towards information
security/implementing security
measures/policy (non-)compliance (14)

Alhogail et al. (2015)

SCT

Bauer & Bernroider (2017)

TRA

Chen (2017)

EPPM

Chu et al. (2015)

TPB

Huang et al. (2016)

Self-efficacy (SCT)

Ifinedo & Idemudia (2017)

OT, DT

Jenkins & Durcikova (2013)

TPB, DTI

Komatsu et al. (2013)

PMT, ELM

Merhi & Ahluwalia (2015)

TPB

Ng & Xu (2007)

HBM, PMT

Nguyen & Kim (2017)

TPB, TRA, self-efficacy (SCT)

Pahnila et al. (2013)

PMT

Parsons et al. (2014)

KAB

Workman & Gathegi (2007)

DT, TPB

Identifying factors that influence insiders'
perceived attributes trust; examine the
impact of attributed trust on computer
abuse (1)

Posey et al. (2011)

CRT

Examining factors that influence deterrence
techniques (1)

Workman & Gathegi (2007)

DT, TPB, GTC

Volume 19

Issue 4

Paper 4

Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application

82

About the Authors
Denitsa Kirova is a research assistant at the Chair of Information Management, University of Hagen,
Germany. She received her Master of Science degree from the University of Rostock, Germany. Her
research focuses on behavioral and managerial aspects of organizational IT security and specifically on
educational and motivational approaches to raise the awareness and expertise of IT users.
Ulrike Baumöl holds the Chair of Information Management at the University of Hagen, Germany. She
received her PhD from the University of Dortmund, Germany, and her postdoctoral lecture qualification in
the field of Management Information Systems from the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. Her current
research focuses on digital innovation and business transformation of organizations and institutions.

Copyright © 2018 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of
all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on
the first page. Copyright for components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information
Systems must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on
servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to
publish from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints or via email from publications@aisnet.org.

Volume 19

Issue 4

Paper 4

83

Factors that Affect the Success of Security Education, Training, and Awareness Programs: A Literature Review

JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY THEORY AND APPLICATION
Editors-in-Chief
Carol Hsu
Tongji University
Monica Tremblay
Florida International University

Virpi Tuunainen
AIS VP for Publications
Ken Peffers, Founding
Editor, Emeritus EIC
Rajiv Kishore,
Emeritus Editor-in-Chief

Aalto University

Governing Board
Lars Mathiassen

University of Nevada Las Vegas

Douglas Vogel

John Venable
Chuan Hoo Tan
Peter Axel Nielsen

Marcus Rothenberger
State University of New York,
Buffalo
Senior Advisory Board
Gurpreet Dhillon
University of Hawaii
Sirkka Jarvenpaa
University of Louisville
Julie Kendall
Singapore Management Univ.
Ting-Peng Liang
Rutgers University
Edward A. Stohr
Georgia State University
HKUST
Senior Editors
Jerry Chang
Curtin University
National University of Singapore Wendy Hui
Jan Mendling
Aalborg University

Sudha Ram
René Riedl
Timo Saarinen

University of Arizona
University of Linz
Aalto University

Murugan Anandarajan
Patrick Chau
Khalil Drira
Peter Green
Peter Kueng
David Yuh Foong Law
Vijay Mookerjee
Georg Peters
Rahul Singh
Issa Traore
Jonathan D. Wareham

Editorial Review Board
F.K. Andoh-Baidoo
Drexel University
Brian John Corbitt
The University of Hong Kong
Lee A. Freeman
LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse
Chang-tseh Hsieh
University of Queensland
Glenn Lowry
Credit Suisse, Zurich
Nirup M. Menon
National Univ of Singapore
David Paper
University of Texas at Dallas
Mahesh S. Raisinghan
Munich Univ of Appl. Sci.
Jeffrey M. Stanton
U. of N. Carolina,Greensboro
Ramesh Venkataraman
University of Victoria, BC
Georgia State University

Tung Bui
Brian L. Dos Santos
Robert Kauffman
Ken Kendall
Ephraim McLean
J. Christopher Westland

Jan Recker
Jason Thatcher

Georgia State University
City University of Hong Kong
University of Nevada Las Vegas

Virginia Commonwealth Univ
University of Texas at Austin
Rutgers University
Nat Sun Yat-sen Univ, Kaohsiung
Stevens Institute of Technology

University of Nevada Las Vegas
Curtin University
Vienna Univ. of Economics &
Business
Queensland Univ of Technology
Clemson University

University of Texas Pan American
Deakin University
The Univ. of Michigan Dearborn
University of Southern Mississippi
United Arab Emirates University
University of Texas at Dallas
Utah State University
University of Dallas
Syracuse University
Indiana University

JITTA is a Publication of the Association for Information Systems
ISSN: 1532-3416

Volume 19

Issue 4

Paper 4

